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Abstract 
Purpose – Research on patient safety campaigns has mostly concentrated on large-
scale multiorganisation efforts, yet locally led improvement is increasingly promoted. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterise the design and implementation of an 
internal patient safety campaign at a large acute National Health Service hospital trust 
with a view to understanding how to optimise such campaigns. 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors conducted a qualitative study of a 
campaign that sought to achieve 12 patient safety goals. The authors interviewed 19 
managers and 45 frontline staff, supplemented by 56 hours of non-participant 
observation. Data analysis was based on the constant comparative method. 
Findings – The campaign was motivated by senior managers’ commitment to patient 
safety improvement, a series of serious untoward incidents, and a history of 
campaign-style initiatives at the trust. While the campaign succeeded in generating 
enthusiasm and focus among managers and some frontline staff, it encountered three 
challenges. First, though many staff at the sharp end were aware of the campaign, 
their knowledge, and acceptance of its content, rationale, and relevance for distinct 
clinical areas were variable. Second, the mechanisms of change, albeit effective in 
creating focus, may have been too limited. Third, many saw the tempo of the 
campaign as too rapid. Overall, the campaign enjoyed some success in raising the 
profile of patient safety. However, its ability to promote change was mixed, and 
progress was difficult to evidence because of lack of reliable measurement. 
Originality/value – The study shows that single-organisation campaignsmay help in 
raising the profile of patient safety. The authors offer important lessons for the 
successful running of such campaigns.  
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Introduction 
Health systems worldwide face challenges in ensuring the delivery of safe, high-
quality care (Wachter, 2010); adverse event studies indicate that approximately 5-10 
per cent of hospitalised patients in high-income countries experience harm, and about 
one-third of harmful events are preventable (Vincent et al., 2001; Baker et al., 2004; 
Thomas et al., 2000; Baines et al., 2013). The need to find ways of addressing these 
problems more effectively has been given added urgency in the English National 
Health Service (NHS) by the recent findings of Sir Robert Francis’s inquiries into 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (Francis, 2010, 2013). The evidence about 
how patient safety problems can best be tackled remains contested and conflicting 
(Shojania and Grimshaw, 2005; Shekelle et al., 2011), but one potentially attractive 
approach is that of the patient safety campaign. 
Though no consensual definition of campaigns exists, they are generally 
characterised by their purposeful attempts to achieve planned effects in their target 
audiences within a specific time period using organised communication (McQuail, 
2010). They have been a feature of patient safety improvement efforts since the early 
2000s, with the US “100,000 Lives” campaign (Berwick et al., 2006) an early 
example. Research on patient safety campaigns has typically focused on large-scale, 
multi-organisation efforts, including the US “Door to Balloon” campaign (Krumholz 
et al., 2008), the UK “cleanyourhands” campaign (Stone et al., 2012) the German 
hand hygiene campaign (Reichardt et al., 2013), and the international “Surviving 
Sepsis” campaign (Levy et al., 2012). Studies of these campaigns have offered 
important lessons for those seeking to undertake improvements across multiple 
organisations. For instance, they have identified the need for shared goals among 
participants, clinician engagement, clinical champions, and the importance of well-
designed, theoretically sound interventions (Soo et al., 2009; Benning et al., 2011b; 
Fuller et al., 2012). Some of the advantages of large-scale campaigns include their 
ability to create conditions known to be important to achieving change on a large 
scale, including developing and standardising technical interventions (Pronovost et 
al., 2009), establishing data collection systems, mobilising peer norms, and 
competitive pressures across different organisations, sharing learning, and providing 
the infrastructure for improvement (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011a, b, 2012; Aveling et 
al., 2012).  
Yet the campaign approach to patient safety is also one that single healthcare 
organisations may pursue internally, particularly when, under policy moves such as 
those currently underway in England (Department of Health, 2010), responsibility for 
how quality and safety are secured is increasingly devolved to local providers rather 
than orchestrated at national level. Individual organisations may be highly motivated 
to take action at local level, especially when confronted with evidence of poor 
performance or weaknesses in systems (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013a, b). Internally run 
campaigns may be especially tempting when opportunities for joining large-scale 
campaigns or programmes are not be aligned with priorities of organisations or their 
timescales for securing improvement. 
In business settings, internal marketing campaigns have a long history; the 
literature in this area suggests that such campaigns have a particular role when shifts 
in staff behaviour must be effected rapidly (Ballantyne, 2000; Hogg et al., 2010). 
However, the conclusions of the corpus of research on what makes internal marketing 
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campaigns work are divergent, and the transferability of learning from these settings 
to healthcare organisations is unclear. Some evidence exists of challenges in single-
organisation patient safety campaigns (Niegsch et al., 2013), but it has remained 
under-studied as approach. There is need to optimise understanding of how single-
organisation patient safety campaigns can best be designed and executed.  
In this paper, we present a qualitative study of one organisation’s patient 
safety campaign. The campaign, which we anonymise as Building and Expanding 
Safety Together (BEST), took place at a large NHS foundation teaching hospital trust 
in England. It sought to improve the organisation’s performance against 12 patient 
safety goals (list below), focusing on one topic per month over a 15-month period. 
Our concern in this study was not to determine the campaign’s effectiveness in 
meeting its goals or to assess its outcomes, but to examine its design and 
implementation by investigating the views and experiences of those who introduced 
the campaign and those at the “sharp end” of practice charged with its 
implementation. With the aim of guiding those who may consider internal patient 
safety campaigns as an improvement strategy, we sought to characterise the 
mechanisms by which BEST attempted to achieve change, the extent to which these 
processes were realised in practice, and the possible unintended consequences of 
deploying a campaign approach to patient safety.  
BEST campaign topics 2010-2011: 
. Protecting patients from thromboembolism. 
. Improving the quality of patient observations. 
. Identifying and managing the deteriorating patient. 
. Conducting effective ward rounds. 
. Improving communication in health records and at handover. 
. Eliminating delays in investigations for patients who are acutely unwell. 
. Ensuring best practice for oxygen therapy. 
. Identifying patients correctly. 
. Eradicating medication errors. 
. Optimising the patient journey. 
. Supervision and training to support patient safety. 
. Preventing avoidable pressure ulcers. 
 
Design and methodology 
Our approach was an organisational case study (Yin, 2009) where the whole hospital 
trust was the unit of analysis. The study was conducted approximately mid-way  
through the BEST campaign run at the trust and involved staff at the “blunt end” 
(executive/board, which we refer to as the senior team) and the “sharp end” (Woods et 
al., 2010) (where staff provide care to patients) of the hospital. Data were collected 
both by an independent external team comprising three researchers and by four 
interviewers internal to the organisation. Author Martin from the external team 
conducted semi-structured interviews with the senior team. Authors Minion and 
Willars from the external team undertook non-participant observation and informal 
chats with staff on wards and units of two clinical areas (surgery and maternity) of the 
hospital over the course of one week. During this time, they also conducted semi-
structured interviews with sharp-end staff. In order to increase the amount of data 
available to the study and ensure that a wide range of clinical areas was represented, 
author Robins plus three other interviewers internal to the organisation (see 
acknowledgements) conducted semi-structured interviews with staff at the sharp end 
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in three medical wards and one unit using the same prompt guide as the external team. 
The internal team did not conduct observations. 
Sampling for interviews at the sharp end was largely opportunistic according 
to availability of staff, and included senior and junior doctors, nurses and midwives, 
healthcare assistants, operating theatre personnel, and ward managers. Researchers’ 
observations and discussions with staff were attentive to cultural and behavioural 
issues in relation to patient safety and quality of care, but included a specific focus on 
aspects of the BEST campaign. They looked, for instance, at what methods of 
dissemination were used, explored staff’s awareness and views on the campaign, and 
sought to understand staff’s perceptions of the impact on the campaign on their 
practices. Interviews were recorded and fully transcribed; ethnographic observations 
were captured in fieldnotes. 
Data analysis of interviews and fieldnotes was based on the constant 
comparative method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The research team initially generated 
“open codes” based on transcripts and fieldwork notes, which were subsequently 
grouped into higher-order organising themes relating to the delivery of the 
BESTcampaign. We also used some sensitising concepts (Charmaz, 2006), derived 
chiefly from the literature on public campaigns. Coding of transcripts was supported 
by NVIVO 8 software. The analysis was subject to extensive discussion within and 
between the internal and external research teams, leading to the development of 
shared interpretations reported in the paper. 
Approval for the study was obtained from an NHS REC. Signed consent was 
obtained from staff who took part in an interview, and permission for observational 
work was obtained verbally. Quotations are numbered to indicate different 
participants and preserve anonymity. 
 
Findings 
We conducted 19 interviews with members of the executive and board teams (the 
“blunt end”), 24 interviews with staff on three medical wards and one medical unit, 15 
interviews in the surgery directorate, and six interviews within the maternity 
department (thus 45 at the “sharp end”). We conducted 56 hours of observations, 
including 54 in clinical areas and two at meetings. We begin by explaining the senior 
team’s rationale for and design of the campaign, and then describe the response of the 
sharp end. 
 
Rationale and design of the campaign 
Interviews with senior team members suggested that they had several motives for the 
campaign. First, the team reported that it took its responsibilities for quality and safety 
seriously, seeing these duties as central to the organisation’s mission. Second, they 
identified a need to achieve rapid institutional change following some serious 
incidents (then known as serious untoward incidents (SUIs)) at the hospital. These 
events, including one incident involving manifestly poor care, created a sense of 
shock and appetite for change among the hospital leadership. The senior team 
reported that they felt galvanised to take swift, decisive action, and that the incidents 
provided a “burning platform” that could command attention and enhance the 
legitimacy of that action.  
Third, the hospital had previously taken part in campaign-style initiatives that 
the senior team considered to have been useful in providing a mission and focus 
around which action could cohere. The senior team were especially persuaded of the 
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potential of campaign approaches by their apparent success in driving down 
healthcare-acquired infections across the organisation:  
 
What we’re trying to do is get a message out there which says you’re a 
part of this organisation [that] is taking the patient experience and the 
quality of patient care very seriously [59]. 
 
We were very keen to get it off the ground quickly part because of the 
SUIs [y] you didn’t want to lose the impetus of the effect of the SUIs 
[61]. 
 
The infection control [campaign] worked, so there’s actually an appetite 
for it, because people see it as a load more work but also they can’t 
argue because the infection control one worked [45]. 
 
In order to take advantage of the profile afforded by the serious incidents, and to 
secure rapid change and high visibility, the campaign was implemented quickly and at 
a fast tempo, initially planned to be one topic a month for 12 months. The intention 
was that once the initial boost had been provided by the campaign, higher standards of 
practices would be embedded and would endure: 
 
Because there’s been such a big change, we decided [that] rather than do 
it little by little, let’s do a big change all at once, to make everybody 
think this is new, we have to think about it [44]. 
 
They’re not meant to be one-month projects, I think that’s the key bit 
about them [y] They’re launched in that month but they’re forever [17]. 
 
The campaign involved a new focus each month. Each of the topics was intended to 
refer to basic standards of care that were equally relevant to all patient groups, and 
would thus be implemented throughout the hospital in all clinical areas. Reference 
groups, overseen by a programme board, were established for each of the topics to 
determine action plans to achieve best practice. These were then implemented through 
a process we termed “communication and compliance”: the standards were signalled 
through a variety of communication methods, and then compliance was monitored 
through a system of spot checks and audits, often involving staff both internal and 
external to clinical areas (sometimes including members of the senior team) making 
inspections. The data were collected from different clinical areas at different times, 
and were not standardised audits. High-quality outcome data were therefore not 
available. 
Determining the details of implementation was mostly left up to the individual 
directorates. The campaign provided guidelines and outlined best practice, and it was 
assumed that change could be led by local “champions” in the clinical areas who 
would have the capability and capacity to drive change. All materials were funded 
from a small campaign budget but the initiative was not supported by additional 
financial resources. Where appropriate to the topic, for example in the area of 
Modified Early Warning Scores (MEWS) and oxygen prescribing teaching, training, 
and competency assessments for staff were offered: 
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It was done on the cheap, it was done very quickly. The budgets stayed 
small for it [y] There’s a bit for publicity with all the posters and 
everything but BEST has been done on the cheap. And maybe it doesn’t 
have to be expensive, because you are relying on champions [21]. 
Our professional development worker makes sure we all go on training 
and that we do attend T raining and then obviously that training is put 
into practice, so yeah I think it’s definitely made an impact [27]. 
 
Among the senior leadership, the intention was to take action reactively in the event 
of non-delivery on project aims; areas found to be failing would then be subject to 
remedial action: 
 
I’ve clearly set out what our expectation is about, we’ve provided the 
training for those staff with the fact that the competence of all of the 
BEST campaign has these elements in it. What we then do is if 
somebody fails to adhere to that policy, we go back through that training 
and competency assessment process again. If they repeatedly do it then 
we will go through the disciplinary process, and we have. So where 
we’ve got areas where people have  repeatedly failed to follow policy in 
respect of patient safety, we really use the disciplinary process [54]. 
 
Interviews suggested that the campaign was largely successful in creating energy, 
focus, and enthusiasm among the senior executive and board team, as well as among 
those directly involved in campaign design: 
 
Front line, I think people are signed up and certainly [y] we have a 
collective group in medicine where the – you know we’ve got a mixture 
of consultants, matrons, sisters who meet on a weekly basis [y] And 
we’ve got really good engagement and they’re really keen [17]. 
 
Though there was no systematic evidence of how the 12 patient safety goals had been 
met, some improvements were reported over the campaign’s course. Increased use of 
MEWS for detecting deteriorating patients, improved staff competence in measuring 
blood pressure, and increased awareness of need for venous thromboembolism 
assessment were reported by some staff at the sharp end as strengths of the campaign: 
 
Yeah, I think when it’s in front of you in black and white you can’t play 
ignorance or anything like that [39]. 
 
It’s to make sure you’ve got good protocols in place that all the trust 
members are aware of, and that everybody is supposed to adhere to 
them, it’s about making sure your patients are safe and the priority [66]. 
 
Several staff also reported a more generally increased focus and attention to the 
importance of safety, and some staff reported feeling increased empowerment: 
 
It has raised or reminded everybody that things like clinical observations 
are really important, ’cause my personal view is that people just thought it 
was another quick job to do and not realised the significance of the results 
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you were recording, and it’s also highlighted some areas of poor practice 
that probably we did think we knew about but were a bit blinded to [32]. 
 
Everyone is more aware of what we’re trying to achieve essentially, and as 
a result I think everyone’s making sure they’re doing things in a safe 
environment and a safe method [y] to eradicate mistakes really [5]. 
 
All kinds of different things really, we’ve been doing the oxygen 
prescribing, dignity with the patients that we do every day on the ward. 
Infection control – hand hygiene, we’ve got them all round the ward, 
corridors, things like that for relatives, so in all different ways. We’ve got 
lots of different information around the wards for the people to access all 
the time [40]. 
 
The campaign did, however, encounter challenges relating to communication, 
mechanisms for securing change, and tempo. 
 
Communication 
Methods for communicating the campaign topics included e-mail, high-visibility 
posters displayed in clinical and non-clinical areas, staff newsletters, staff meetings, 
and contact with middle managers. The effectiveness of these methods in creating 
awareness among staff at the sharp end was variable. Generally, we found higher 
levels of awareness on medical wards than in the surgical and maternity directorates: 
all 24 staff on medical wards demonstrated some awareness of the campaign, and 22 
demonstrated reasonable understanding though only five were clear about why the 
campaign started. Of the 21 staff in the surgical and maternity areas, 17 showed  
awareness of the campaign but only eight showed a clear understanding. Some of the 
persuasive power of the campaign was thus diminished: 
 
I think every hospital [within the trust] is aware of the BEST campaign, 
everyone is more aware of what we’re trying to achieve essentially and as 
a result I think everyone’s making sure they’re doing things in a safe 
environment and a safe method to ensure [y] to eradicate mistakes really 
[75]. 
 
[I]t came through posters. It should have come through the team 
management but it didn’t. [y] [I]t wasn’t disseminated down [31]. 
 
I was chatting to this midwife and another midwife in the room about 
BEST and neither of them really knew the term BEST [fieldnotes]. 
 
Though for the senior team the serious incidents at the hospital had provided some of 
the motivation for the campaign and the opportunity to capture attention and direct 
action, staff at the sharp end varied in their knowledge of the rationale for BEST. 
Some knew of the incidents, but they were far from common knowledge: 
 
The number of SUIs at the beginning of last year were centred very much 
round the MEWS and staff escalating concerns and I think that’s brought 
it very much to the forefront, definitely [76]. 
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I don’t know of any specific event that triggered it [53]. 
 
I don’t know ‘cause I don’t know much about it [70]. 
 
A further important challenge of communication was that of customisation to the 
specific circumstances, needs, and priorities of distinct clinical areas. Though the 
designers of BEST had taken steps to identify standards that should apply to all areas 
of care, the reality turned out to be more complex. In some medical areas, the 
campaign was generally perceived as broadly appropriate, but in the surgical and 
maternity areas staff at the sharp end saw some campaign themes as less relevant:  
 
I think it’s quite relevant and applies to most of what we do so I think we 
can implement it in all areas really [16]. 
 
Some of the topics might not be applicable as much in our area as an 
inpatient ward but I think the ones that are, are very, very relevant [11]. 
 
Different parts of this BEST campaign have been generic. They have 
gone, the whole trust has to be doing this particular thing and it doesn’t let 
you take account of a particular area and the particular needs of an area 
[20]. 
 
Perhaps the most negatively viewed topic was oxygen prescribing. Practitioners 
reported that they were being told how to do something they already knew how to do 
or that it was not something used frequently in their clinical areas. Here the challenges 
of communication were evident: staff were unaware that oxygen prescribing had been 
the subject of an National Patient Safety Agency alert, and of the significance of 
oxygen prescribing in one of the SUIs that had occurred at the hospital:  
 
I have given oxygen for 28 years, and now I am going to get somebody 
who is probably, I am old enough to be their grandma coming in and 
seeing if I can put an oxygen mask on somebody correctly, that does hack 
you off [15]. 
 
She was quite negative about it in many ways because she associated it 
with scoring, particularly with oxygen scores and saying how it just does 
not apply to the maternity unit [y] this is something that is so rarely used 
in the maternity section, that she felt as though it was a bit of a waste of 
time [y] Again she sort of shrugged her shoulders when talking about the 
BEST campaign [fieldnotes]. 
 
Mechanisms of change 
Implementation of the campaign fell largely to middle managers, such as ward 
matrons. Their implementation strategies involved talking to staff, training, and 
highlighting areas for improvement. The principal enforcement mechanism was 
assessing compliance through spot checks and audits: 
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What I’ve done is going round every single member of staff and explained 
the process of [oxygen] prescribing and monitoring and we’ve already 
started running with that so that we can iron out all those problems and we 
can start competency assessing people in this area. So the staff on the shop 
floor know what’s happening because I’m coming out telling them “this is 
what we’re doing, this is what we need to be doing and I’m going to come 
round and audit it” [26]. 
 
However, many middle managers were already stretched. They reported considerable 
frustration at not having additional resources for the campaign, particularly to support 
training, and unrealistic expectations of how rapidly change could be achieved. Staff 
perception of the spot checks was mixed; though some staff in medical wards reported 
positive experiences of this approach, others found them punitive, imbued with a 
language of “failure”: 
 
We were trained how to do it at the start, and then obviously you’d do it 
and you’d be assessed to make sure you were doing it properly, so I think 
it’s all been successful [25]. 
 
Then they arrived to do a spot check [y] So then we failed [y] for the 
auditors to come and include the next topic in their audit and they just 
caught us completely on the hop this time because we had not 
[implemented it], it was too big, in two weeks [y] so that’s frustrating 
because you feel like you are just setting us up to fail every time [39]. 
 
Many staff at the sharp end reported that they would have preferred an approach to 
change that went beyond signalling, monitoring, and then enforcing standards through 
managerial mechanisms. Some, for example, indicated that they would have 
welcomed coaching and peer learning: 
 
I don’t think I have been in anyway other instructed; I just read as it comes 
along really [48]. 
 
That has been the case with all of it really, they have brought different 
things in they haven’t always explained, what you are supposed to be 
doing with it and when you are supposed to be doing it [20]. 
 
I am not sure if some of the good practice [y] that is happening in other 
directorates has been shared [y] I would love to know what have other 
areas done [12]. 
 
The value of sharing learning seemed to be underlined by evidence that practices 
across the hospital were not always standardised, and that good ideas and simple 
innovations (such as using a sticker on patients’ notes to indicate correct oxygen 
saturation levels for that patient) did not always disseminate beyond local clinical 
areas.  
 
Tempo 
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Though the topics were intended to reflect standards of care that should be reached by 
all care delivery areas, wards, and units varied in the extent to which they were 
already meeting these standards and the extent to which their systems could support 
change. Some staff, particularly at middle-manager level, reported feeling daunted by 
the effort necessary to make change in their local areas, were not always convinced 
that the changes were relevant or appropriate, or felt that other local patient safety 
risks should take priority over those identified by BEST. Consequently, rather than 
raising the profile of patient safety and orchestrating improvements, in some areas 
there was a sense that BEST was a source of distraction rather than focus: 
 
I mean if you just look around the office there’s so much – every week, 
we’ve got to do this this week, we’ve got to do that this week. Sometimes 
you just feel swamped with it. [y] Sometimes I go through my email and 
there’s like six new things when I’ve been off two days and I think I’ve no 
idea what they are talking about [34]. 
 
The tempo of the campaign, with its monthly change of topic and accumulation of 
audits, led to some staff, again especially at middle-management level, feeling 
overwhelmed by the amount of work required, and frustrated by having to move from 
one topic to the next without having fully delivered on their aspirations for the first: 
  
One of the difficulties with the speed of it, i.e. doing something every 
month, is that you’re just constantly at people for things, you know, you’re 
constantly saying ‘right, so we’ve done obs[ervations] now, right, so are 
we onto oxygen now’ and “how are we doing with oxygen” and, you 
know, I find myself doing it too, I’m asking people “right, so where are 
we with the plan, what’s happened, where are we” and sometimes I bet 
they think shut up woman, you know, I’m just trying to get through the 
day for God’s sake! [8]. 
 
Conclusions and practical implications 
How to design and run patient safety campaigns so that they deliver on their goals is 
an important question (Vincent, 2010). Most studies of patient safety campaigns have 
focused on large-scale, multi-organisation efforts. However, internal campaigns may 
be an attractive choice for single organisations seeking to secure locally led 
improvement. Our qualitative study of a patient safety campaign in a single NHS trust 
found, like other studies of patient safety interventions (Benning et al., 2011b), 
evidence of sincerity, commitment, and enthusiasm among senior leadership in the 
hospital about improving patient safety. Though there appeared to be some gains in 
focus and improved practice at the sharp end, the impact was mixed and difficult to 
evidence – not least because of the absence of high-quality collection of data on 
outcomes or process improvements. Our study highlights both the potential and 
limitations of the single organisation patient safety campaign approach, as well as 
important lessons for how it can be optimised (Table I). 
Single-organisation patient safety campaigns such as BEST appear to have 
important agenda-setting functions (McCombs and Shaw, 1993), signalling local 
organisational priorities and commitments, and seem capable of providing an 
identifiable sense of mission appropriate to the local context. BEST appeared to be 
successful in raising the profile of some patient safety issues, particularly in relation 
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to the use of early warning scores for detecting patient deterioration. It enjoyed a very 
high level of commitment among the senior team: they could link the campaign very 
clearly and explicitly to locally need, and they saw it as helpful in providing a 
response to catastrophic serious incidents. Such events may force problem recognition 
and create opportunities for achieving change (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011a, b), but 
many sharp-end staff appeared unaware of them. In capitalising on the “burning 
platform” effect, BEST might have made more effective use of patient narrative as a 
resource for persuasion and engagement (Dixon-Woods et al., 2012). 
Both single-organisation and multi-organisation campaigns may falter if they 
are over-ambitious: our analysis of BEST and of large-scale programmes suggests 
that more may be achieved by trying to do less (Dixon-Woods et al., 2012). Though 
each of the goals was important in BEST, and in many senses reflected practice that 
staff were expected to achieve anyway, it is doubtful that a single campaign could 
succeed in making progress towards all goals quickly. Crowding the agenda by 
having too many rapidly sequenced objectives risked diluting, rather than amplifying, 
the energy and momentum the campaign sought to create. Such crowding risked 
creating what we call “priority thickets” (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013a, b). These 
thickets comprise dense patches of goals that may compete with one another, or 
obscure what staff should be focusing on, and may create a sense of failure when it 
proves difficult to reach goals. Making unrealistic demands on staff may lead to 
resentment and demoralisation: campaigns require a “balanced scope” (Bacdayan, 
2001) in which objectives are appropriate to the resources available. The rapid tempo 
of the BEST campaign added to this problem and contributed to a sense of fatigue. 
There were thus significant risks that the novelty of the campaign could wear off 
through time, with hard-hitting messages fading into the background (Lewis et al., 
2006). Setting a smaller number of goals, and a more realistic time-scale for 
implementation, might help to avert such risks. A slower pace of change might also 
enable more organisational learning during the implementation of the initiative, so 
that sustainable solutions are favoured over quick fixes. 
In determining tempo and priorities, campaign leaders might usefully 
distinguish clearly between more and less demanding topics (in terms of their 
complexity and degree of effort needed to implement them) and adjust the pace of 
change accordingly. More engagement with the issues facing different functions and 
clinical areas of an organisation at the planning stage may also be very useful, in order 
to customise goals, avert an unwarranted perception of “ivory towers” designers 
(Gilmore, 2000), and minimise mismatches between the expectations, experiences, 
and perceptions of  blunt- and sharp-end staff (Benning et al., 2011a, b). As a more 
general principle, campaigns may best be used where the issues they address are 
universally relevant; “targeted therapies” (narrower, more localised work) may 
sometimes be more beneficial than “blockbuster medicine” (organisation-wide 
campaigns).  
Being clear and focused about goals and standards and communicating them 
clearly are vital to any campaign, but are only part of what needs to happen. Attention 
is also needed to how to support staff in making change. BEST relied on a 
communication-and-compliance model, and was not prescriptive about how change 
should be achieved, instead relying on local clinical leadership. The strategy of using 
audits and spot checks was useful in focusing staff and demonstrating the seriousness 
and intent of the organisation’s leadership. The physical presence of senior staff 
members when doing spot checks demonstrated the level of leadership interest in 
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what was happening on the clinical areas. However, BEST did not provide a specific 
package of technical and cultural support, sharing of peer learning, and formal high 
quality measurement, which all appear to be the features of successful improvement  
programmes (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011a, b, 2013a, b; Pham et al., 2012). Using 
multiple strategies to gain support of sharp-end staff may be more effective that one-
way communication. Sharing learning and solutions across the different clinical areas 
may help create more momentum and more of a sense of collective purpose (Aveling 
et al., 2012). Standardised, longitudinal, quality-assured measurement means that the 
opportunity to track progress over time, and the benefits of ongoing, credible 
feedback on progress are not lost (Dixon-Woods et al., 2012). 
Our study of BEST does, of course, suffer from some limitations. It is a single 
case study, and we cannot test the generalisability of our findings to other settings. 
We cannot link the processes we observed to the outcomes of the campaign, since 
these outcomes were not measured consistently or reliably. Though we conducted a  
large number of interviews, we did not include staff from all areas of the hospital, and 
thus may not have detected the full range of views or experiences of the campaign. 
Interviews themselves do not provide unmediated access to reality; the possibility that 
participants may have been providing publicly acceptable accounts cannot be 
excluded. In addition, our opportunistic sampling strategy was successful in gaining 
access to a wide range of staff at the sharp end, but may have introduced some 
undetected bias. Further, some of the differences we found in different clinical areas 
may arise because the interviews were conducted by different researchers, with some 
internal and some external to the organisation. On the other hand, the diversity of 
interviewers may have ensured that a range of perspectives was captured. Finally, the 
way we collected our data and undertook the analysis leaves open other possible 
interpretations of our material.  
An internal campaign approach may be useful way of improving the profile of 
patient safety within healthcare organisations, but it needs to be designed to involve 
more than communication-and-compliance and to contain the scope of its ambitions. 
Patient safety campaigns are perhaps best used alongside other techniques such as 
incentivisation, leadership development, training in specific improvement 
methodologies, and knowledge sharing between units about successful strategies 
(Dixon-Woods et al., 2012). Our study provides some valuable learning on how the 
campaign approach might be optimised.  
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Table 1 - Key lessons from the BEST campaign 
 
Design  Use vivid events in the area of patient safety (e.g. serious 
incidents) to capture attention and emotional engagement Use 
robust, credible, sensitive measures to evidence change and 
reduce risk of staff resistance, fatigue, complacency or 
disillusionment Select the scope of the campaign carefully. 
Sometimes more can be achieved by doing less. 
 
Communication  Ensure that frontline staff see the campaign as relevant to their 
day-to-day activities Clearly explain and reinforce the rationale 
behind the campaign; use emotional engagement and high-
quality data Identify elements of the campaign relevant for the 
entire organisation but customise where needed. 
 
Mechanisms of  Build in support for valid measurement from the start. 
This is the authors’ accepted manuscript of an article published in Journal of Health 
Organisation and Management 28(4): 562-575, which has been published in final form at 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/JHOM-02-2013-0035. 
 17 
change  Set challenging goals that are realistic in terms of scope and 
timing. 
Utilise a variety of support and enforcement mechanisms, not 
just one. 
 
Tempo  Avoid “campaign fatigue” by building in periods for 
consolidation and round-up. 
Different clinical areas may be at different stages; some may 
require more support than others. 
Look for possible unintended consequences (e.g. distraction, 
deterioration in areas not targeted by the campaign). 
